Because there is something rather than nothing, there will always be the potential for something to exist. Even if that state of potential is absent anything else.
Let me know if any of this stuff sounds like word salad to you and I'll try to clarify. I feel like I'm fighting a one-sided battle in this war of ideas.
Just realized that you might respond to this by saying that the difference between the abstract theories of science and any other abstract theories is that the abstract theories of science are the only ones that are based on empirical fact. But I'd argue (like Wittgenstein did) that there are other kinds of facts, than just empirical ones. A fact is just anything that is the case. So this would include the facts of the phenomenology of experience/consciousness (for instance, the fact that anything that happens, happens FOR consciousness), or the facts pertaining to all events being situated in particular historical contexts.
Yes, but what would be the ontological status of that state of potential when it alone exists? It couldn't be a material and empirical thing, could it? So would it have to be an immaterial and metaphysical thing? It seems to me that if it is composed purely of potential then it must be something entirely abstract and non-empirical and therefore only knowable by science through theoretical/mathematical models. But how can we prove the findings of science's theoretical/mathematical models if they hypothesize states of being that are, by their very definition, impossible to be experienced as phenomena and empirically verified. Your claim involves relying on the theoretical constructs of our current scientific data which, as we've seen from paradigm shifts in science in the past, are historically relative to a large extent, and thus subject to fundamental changes. It's possible (and perhaps more moral) to interpret reality through other theoretical approaches from history such as Phenomenology, Transcendental Idealism, Existentialism, literary hermeneutics, as well as the many other world views developed in the various world religions, wherein it is not necessarily the case that a state of potential will always exist.
The theoretical models of science are formulated by applying logic and mathematics to empirical data, but the theoretical states of being posited by these models are not empirical and are, in fact, by their very nature, impossible to be subjectively experienced. So the question becomes, when discussing the metaphysical possibilities of the fundamental nature of reality (such as, if a state of potential always exists), whether the theoretical models of science are the best theoretical models to talk about non-empirical things. It's plausible that the models we build on the limited empirical data we have at this point in history are not sufficient to accurately describe the fundamental, metaphysical nature of reality.
Ok, you think that absolute nothing can't exist, but the real question is whether absolute everything can exist. Do you think that absolute everything can exist?
Well, I guess it's not exactly 'always' capable of creation, because if its a "state of potential absent anything else" then its only existent when nothing else exists. But I guess I mean that it's capable of creation when it needs to be, just like God, i.e. only doing miracles 2000 years ago haha!
Ok, just had another thought - if potentiality can never go away, then couldn't this state of potential be considered an eternal being itself? Similarly to the concept of God, this state of potential is eternally existing and is always capable of creation.
What would that state of potential which is absent anything else really "be" then? Wouldn't it lack all empirical attributes since it is purely potential and therefore nothing actual, supposing that all things that are actual are only actual insofar as they are empirically verifiable as actually existing? So would you have to presuppose potentiality is a kind of abstract structuring principle of reality as such (maybe not a 'being' itself but definitely a permanent positive feature of being, nonetheless) that can exist independent of any corporeal actuality, in order to differentiate absolute nothing from this state of potential which is absent anything else?
I assume a strategy for winning chess with only a king can NEVER exist.
Let me know if any of this stuff sounds like word salad to you and I'll try to clarify. I feel like I'm fighting a one-sided battle in this war of ideas.
Just realized that you might respond to this by saying that the difference between the abstract theories of science and any other abstract theories is that the abstract theories of science are the only ones that are based on empirical fact. But I'd argue (like Wittgenstein did) that there are other kinds of facts, than just empirical ones. A fact is just anything that is the case. So this would include the facts of the phenomenology of experience/consciousness (for instance, the fact that anything that happens, happens FOR consciousness), or the facts pertaining to all events being situated in particular historical contexts.
Also, can absolute everything exist, based on our scientific understanding of the cosmos?
Yes, but what would be the ontological status of that state of potential when it alone exists? It couldn't be a material and empirical thing, could it? So would it have to be an immaterial and metaphysical thing? It seems to me that if it is composed purely of potential then it must be something entirely abstract and non-empirical and therefore only knowable by science through theoretical/mathematical models. But how can we prove the findings of science's theoretical/mathematical models if they hypothesize states of being that are, by their very definition, impossible to be experienced as phenomena and empirically verified. Your claim involves relying on the theoretical constructs of our current scientific data which, as we've seen from paradigm shifts in science in the past, are historically relative to a large extent, and thus subject to fundamental changes. It's possible (and perhaps more moral) to interpret reality through other theoretical approaches from history such as Phenomenology, Transcendental Idealism, Existentialism, literary hermeneutics, as well as the many other world views developed in the various world religions, wherein it is not necessarily the case that a state of potential will always exist.
The theoretical models of science are formulated by applying logic and mathematics to empirical data, but the theoretical states of being posited by these models are not empirical and are, in fact, by their very nature, impossible to be subjectively experienced. So the question becomes, when discussing the metaphysical possibilities of the fundamental nature of reality (such as, if a state of potential always exists), whether the theoretical models of science are the best theoretical models to talk about non-empirical things. It's plausible that the models we build on the limited empirical data we have at this point in history are not sufficient to accurately describe the fundamental, metaphysical nature of reality.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSE. do it more please
Ok, you think that absolute nothing can't exist, but the real question is whether absolute everything can exist. Do you think that absolute everything can exist?
Well, I guess it's not exactly 'always' capable of creation, because if its a "state of potential absent anything else" then its only existent when nothing else exists. But I guess I mean that it's capable of creation when it needs to be, just like God, i.e. only doing miracles 2000 years ago haha!
Ok, just had another thought - if potentiality can never go away, then couldn't this state of potential be considered an eternal being itself? Similarly to the concept of God, this state of potential is eternally existing and is always capable of creation.
Travis, can you respond to my questions? I think that the extinction of all potentiality is possible.
What would that state of potential which is absent anything else really "be" then? Wouldn't it lack all empirical attributes since it is purely potential and therefore nothing actual, supposing that all things that are actual are only actual insofar as they are empirically verifiable as actually existing? So would you have to presuppose potentiality is a kind of abstract structuring principle of reality as such (maybe not a 'being' itself but definitely a permanent positive feature of being, nonetheless) that can exist independent of any corporeal actuality, in order to differentiate absolute nothing from this state of potential which is absent anything else?
"nothing" is only a word and not anything more.